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Darren Ell
In his acclaimed new book, Damming the Flood: Haiti, Aristide and the Politics of Containment, Professor Peter Hallward recounts in rich detail the Haitian people's democratic struggle and the efforts of the international community to contain it. Noam Chomsky has called Hallward's book a "riveting and deeply informed account" of Haitian history. Dr. Paul Farmer describes it as "the best study of its kind." The book is of particular importance for Canadian, French and American readers whose governments participated in the 2004 overthrow of democracy in Haiti. Montreal photojournalist Darren Ell conducted the following interview with Peter Hallward on May 14th, 2008.
DE: Outside of activist circles, I constantly hear references to "Aristide the Dictator." Who is "Aristide the dictator" and why is he still in the forefront of the popular imagination?
PH: The characterization of Aristide as a dictator is a direct result of his popularity in Haiti. Aristide was and remains connected to a popular mobilisation unprecedented in the modern history of Haiti. Since the beginning, those who have reason to fear such a mobilisation have always portrayed Aristide as a tyrant, even a "psychopath." This is part of a long neo-colonial tradition omnipresent in the so-called "West": a leader (Lumumba, Mandela, Chavez, Morales...) who is capable of mobilizing a majority of the oppressed population, who maintains a certain autonomy vis-à-vis the major powers, is automatically presented in the media and in political circles as dangerous or tyrannical , even as a terrorist. In a certain way, Aristide "was" somewhat dangerous, if we take an elite status quo point of view: he was elected twice with huge majorities, he was able to defeat both his political and military enemies, and at the beginning of his second mandate in 2001, he was in a position to impose a number of reforms that could have harmed - although very little in fact - the interests of the dominant classes in Haiti and of "the friends of Haiti" (the US, France and Canada). In 2001, for the first time, he was in a strong political position. Once he had eliminated the army (which had overthrown his first government in 1991), he was no longer confronted with a direct extra-political military obstacle.
It was therefore essential to destabilise his government, reign in his autonomy and reduce his popularity. To this end, the media as well as French and American diplomats portrayed him as being "intransigent" and "violent." Neither accusation had any connection to reality. After 1991, he was characterized as "intransigent" because he outright refused to accept a government imposed by a military that had just killed thousands of his supporters in a coup d'état! Ten years later, history repeated itself: despite his party's overwhelming majority in the Parliament (in 2000, his party Fanmi Lavalas won 72 of 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies), Aristide accepted a large number of compromises with his adversaries. He put some of them in his cabinet, he tried to include them in the Electoral Council, he accepted more than twenty agreements negotiated internationally with the "democratic opposition" that was demanding his resignation, etc.. In fact, it was this opposition that showed remarkable intransigence by refusing the 2000 election results and by refusing to take part in new elections. As far as the accusations of violence, it was more or less the same thing.
DE: But Aristide has often been associated with violence, and a number of NGO's have characterized his second mandate as a long "crisis of human rights."
PH: That's a good one! He was even compared to the dictator François Duvalier. This quickly became received truth for publications such as Le Monde, for diplomats such as Roger Noriega and researchers such as Laënnec Hurbon. Don't forget the historical references in question: maybe 50,000 political murders under the Duvaliers, 4,000 during the first coup d'état against Aristide (1991-94), maybe 3,000 during the second coup against Aristide (2004-06). And under Aristide himself? Political violence came close to a complete stop! Obviously there is always violence connected to the economic situation in Haiti, a situation easily understood, and this existed before and after Aristide. When he was in power, this didn't stop miraculously, and he was not a miracle worker. During the first Aristide mandate, there were two or three documented incidents in which opponents of the government were killed, to my knowledge without any involvement of the government itself. During his second mandate, the political opposition (with the support of the US and the European Union) collaborated with a paramilitary opposition. The government and its supporters were forced to defend themselves against intermittent Contra-style attacks. The situation was more tense, and there were definitely some violent incidents between government supporters and their adversaries. Despite this situation, the best estimates for the number of victims of political violence that can be linked at most indirectly to the government between 2001 and 2004 varies from 10 to 20 people. The least one can say is that the comparison with Duvalier is very daring!
DE: In the title of your book, you use the word "containment." What do you mean by this?
PH: The popular mobilization that began at the end of the 1980s and which adopted Aristide as its spokesperson was called Lavalas, which means "avalanche" or "flood" as well as "everyone." They believed that mobilizing everyone could create a political force that would liberate the country of the Duvalierist legacy and the all-powerful traditional ruling elite. The elite had two ways they could fight back. The first was the neo-Duvalierist option, using military force. This was the strategy of 1991. The other was more flexible, more "democratic," more adapted to the new world order. The elite would accept the election results but (a) force the government to adopt a policy that pleased the elite and their foreign friends but which contained disastrous economic policies (the suspension of all aid and international credit); (b) portray the government as tyrannical and corrupt in what they called the "independent media" (in reality owned by the elite or subsidized by foreign powers); (c) force the government to use violence and defend itself against paramilitary attacks. This way they could "contain" the popular mobilization and offer "realistic" options instead of radical hopes, "moderation" and a return to normalcy under the guidance of the wise Haitian elite. In the end, both strategies had to be used. In order to overthrow Aristide during Haiti's bicentennial in 2004, they had to launch a military insurrection with the help of the "democratic opposition."
DE: There are currently 9,000 foreign soldiers in Haiti (the UN armed forces, or MINUSTAH). Besides their numerous crimes, they have been criticized for having legitimated the coup d'état. However, they say that it's because of their presence that the country has returned to calm since the period of the coup. How do you see the presence of MINUSTAH in Haiti?
PH: MINUSTAH's role is ambiguous. Some say that the foreign troops are less aggressive than the former Haitian military, and that for the moment they represent the lesser of two evils. However, the real question is: why is there a foreign military presence in Haiti? Because the countries that dominate the UN, in particular the US, France and Canada, participated directly in a coup d'état against the constitutional government in 2004. This is a military occupation. MINUSTAH was installed to force Haitians to accept the overthrow of the elected government, and they killed dozens of people during their scandalous "police operations." This is only one of a series of means by which Haiti is being denied its sovereignty, and which makes the current president, René Préval, relatively powerless.
DE: What is your analysis of the food crisis in Haiti?
PH: With some investment and agrarian reform, Haiti could feed itself independently of foreign powers. Once again it's a question of power and sovereignty. The international community, with the support of its comprador sectors in the Haitian elite (a small number of families that control imports), imposed structural adjustment programs 25 years ago. These programs made Haiti dependent on international markets. Rice is the staple food throughout Haiti. In 1985, Haiti imported 7,000 tons of US rice, but 15 years later it imported 220,000 tons, 65% of national consumption. The majority of Haitians live off a dollar or two a day. When foreign prices rise, people start dying of hunger. What's more, the political instability created by the enemies of the popular movement, the tendency in Haiti and elsewhere to treat political conflicts as military or police issues, the running of government services by NGOs, blatant injustice in international commercial relations and so forth, all of this reduces the government's capacity to act in a crisis.
DE: Is it accurate to say that the success of democracy in Haiti depends in part on what happens outside of Haiti? If this is true, how important would you say activism is outside of Haiti? On what should activists focus their energy?
PH: Unfortunately, the Haitian Government is very dependent on the powerful countries that dominate it. It is essential that the citizens of these countries push their governments to change their behaviour. This has been clear for a long time and nowhere has it been more clear than in Haiti. What is needed is nothing less than a revolution in the relationship between rich and poor nations. Colonial practices must be brought to a full stop. What matters now is not doing this or that but rather stopping doing a certain number of things. We must put an end to practices that further impoverish already poor people, that make weak states even weaker, and that make the oppressed even more oppressed. Immediately. The current situation is obscene, and we the citizens of countries like Canada and the United States are largely responsible.
This interview was originally published in French in Le Couac, June 2008.
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